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Slavery and the Law: A Study in Contradiction
IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE & THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROC-
EsS-THE COLONIAL PERIOD. By A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr.t
New York: Oxford University Press, 1978. Pp. xxiii, 512. $15.00.
Reviewed by Aviam Soifer*
Consider this book1 the next time you are staring at your melting
sherbet at the end of a Law Day speech about the majesty of the law
and the glory of the Founding Fathers' vision. Judge Higginbotham's
important study of law and race relations is a useful antidote for self-
congratulation, an occupational hazard of lawyers. In the Matter of
Color is the first volume in Judge Higginbotham's projected three-vol-
ume study of the progress of racial justice in America. He has assem-
bled cases and statutes into a lucid and convincing demonstration of
the lamentable role of law as an instrument of oppression in our colo-
nial period. His work contains several serious limitations, but Judge
Higginbotham makes a powerful case for his central point that "the
American legal process was able to set its conscience aside and, by
pragmatic toadying to economic 'needs,' rationalize a regression of
human rights for blacks."2 His study of six colonies-Virginia, Massa-
chusetts, New York, South Carolina, Georgia, and Pennsyl-
vania-makes clear the inhumanity behind the law pertaining to race
from the arrival of white settlers until the Revolutionary period. As
the horrors multiply, Judge Higginbotham manages both to control his
own passion and to avoid numbing the reader's conscience. This is a
consciousness-raising book, in the best tradition of the Brandeis brief.
Fact is piled on painful fact; the law emerges as the increasingly harsh
controller of slaves and even, on occasion, the controller of masters.
t Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Judicial Circuit.
* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. B.A. 1969, M.U.S. 1972,
J.D. 1972, Yale University.





Judge Higginbotham begins his task with a powerful preface that
recounts an incident of racism directed at him when he was a sixteen-
year-old college freshman. In Part One he provides a tightly written
description of the legalization of black suppression as an integral part
of our history. The rule of law is sternly implicated by this judicious
federal judge in the "extraordinary brutality" of "a solid legal tradition
for the absolute enslavement of blacks."3 Part Two, the bulk of the
book, details the black experience as it was mirrored in the law of the
selected six colonies. These six studies do not provide sufficient com-
parison and contrast and are quite uneven, yet each is interesting in
itself. The cumulative portrait is an overwhelming demonstration of
the role of the law in aiding and occasioning the most basic inhuman-
ity. Part Three details the events, cases, and lawyers' arguments that
resulted in the famous decision by Lord Mansfield in Somerset v.
Stewart that a slave brought onto English soil was free.4 In Part Four,
Judge Higginbotham discusses the Declaration of Independence, and
briefly addresses the question, posed by Abraham Lincoln, whether the
proposition that "all men are created equal" really was "a self-evident
lie."' The Epilogue concludes that "[t]here were sufficient legal, theo-
logical, and philosophical foundations upon which a more uniformly
just and humane social structure could have been built."6
Judge Higginbotham is not a professional historian. He does not
attempt to place his book in the context of the important debate among
legal historians over issues such as whether law is sufficiently autono-
mous to speak usefully of law itself as an instrument of oppression, or
whether law can adequately be studied through the lenses of case re-
ports and statutory enactments.7 This failure is both the greatest weak-
ness and the peculiar strength of his book.
In the Matter of Color suffers from pointillism; there is too much
detail without sufficient interpretation. Little is added directly to the
sophisticated theoretical debate among historians such as Stanley El-
3. Pp. 13, 14.
4. Somerset v. Stewart, Lofft 1, 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B. 1772). For a review of the contro-
versy concerning the accuracy of the case report in Somerset, see Wiecek, Somerset: Lord Mans-
field and the Legitimacy of Slavery in the Anglo-4merican World, 42 U. CHI. L. Rv. 86, 141-46
(1974).
5. Quoted at p. 371.
6. P. 390.
7. See, e.g., Horwitz, The Conservative Tradition in the Writing of4merican Legal History,
17 AM. 3. LEGAL HIST. 275 (1973); Horwitz, Book Review, 86 YALE L.J. 561 (1977) (reviewing E.
THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HuNTERS (1975) and D. HAY, P. LINEBAUGH, J. RULE, E. THOMPSON &
C. WINSLOW, ALBION'S FATAL TREE (1975)).
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kins,8 Winthrop Jordan,' David Brion Davis,' 0 Robert Cover," Ed-
mund S. Morgan,"2 and Eugene Genovese' 3 about racism, slavery, and
the law. At times Judge Higginbotham ignores the most enlightening
and provocative insights of these scholars. He has a tendency to rely
too much on sparse and incomplete legal records, and he does not con-
sider the context of judicial decisions and legislation sufficiently.' 4 Fi-
nally, Judge Higginbotham pays little attention to the gap between the
law articulated by judges and councilors and the law of slavery as it
actually was practiced.
That there was a gap, if not a chasm, between theory and practice
in the law of slavery is a basic point in Genovese's important chapter
on the hegemony of the law in Roll, Jordan, Roll. '1 In practice, slave-
holders already had complete control and discretion over the lives and
living conditions of their slaves, so why did they even bother to codify
laws of slavery? Perhaps the answer lies at the frontiers of current
speculation about the hegemonic function of law and its utility to the
ruling class and about Weber's "rationalization" of the law.16 Clearly
defined legal duties may well have been hortatory, intended more for
the master's overseer than the master's slave.
This interpretation helps to account for the irony of Virginia's
1705 statute that provided for the posting of proclamations about run-
away slaves on church doors. With the support of both church and
state, it was then "lawful for any person or persons whatsoever, to kill
and destroy such slaves by such ways and means as he, she, or they
shall think fit, without accusation or impeachment of any crime for the
same."'17 This legalization of lawlessness is but one example of the
vital symbolic function of the law as it codified absolute power in
whites and total subjugation of blacks. Judge Higginbotham is sensi-
8. S. ELKINS, SLAVERY (1959).
9. W. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK (1968).
10. D. DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION: 1770-1823 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION]; D. DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN
WESTERN CULTURE (1966).
11. R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED (1975).
12. E. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM (1975).
13. Eg., E. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL (1974).
14. Insufficient attention is paid to excellent local studies of the colonies he considers. See,
ag., E. MORGAN, supra note 12; J. RUSSELL, THE FREE NEGRO IN VIRGINIA: 1619-1865 (31 Johns
Hopkins U. Stud. in Hist. and Pol. Sci. Monograph No. 3, 1913); A. ZILVERSMIT, THE FIRST
EMANCIPATION (1967).
15. E. GENOVESE, supra note 13, at 25-49.
16. 2 M. WEBER, ECONOMY & SOCIETY 641-900 (G. Roth & C. Wittich eds. 1968). See
generally Mann, Legal Rationalization and the Social Uses of Litigation in Connecticut, 1700-
1760 (1978) (unpublished manuscript on file at the Texas Law Review).
17. Quoted at p. 56.
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tive to this educative function of the law. The law as a symbol-for
selfish economic purposes throughout most of the book, but for occa-
sional flashes of hope as in Somerset and the Declaration of Indepen-
dence-is an important theme.
The law was not only a symbol of oppression, it was hypocritical.
This emerges as an overwhelming indictment throughout the book.
For example, the legal denial of personhood to blacks occurred simul-
taneously with the law's frequent recognition of and dependency upon
the free will of blacks. Perhaps the paradigmatic instance occurred in
laws passed in several colonies to deal with the problem of whether
choosing to become a Christian might alter a slave's status. Since bap-
tism required free choice, at least in theory, slave owners feared that
they might have to treat Christian slaves in a Christian manner. The
problem was compounded by the widespread belief that offering bap-
tism to heathens was itself a benevolent justification for slavery. The
law resolved the dilemma for the slave owners. The New York law of
1706 is only the most overtly inconsistent: "In order. . . to put an end
to all such Doubts and Scruples," the Governor's Council and Assem-
bly provided that "such Negro, Indian and Mulatto Slaves who belong
to them and desire the same, should be Baptized."' 18  Yet "the Baptiz-
ing of any Negro, Indian or Mulatto Slave shall not be any Cause or
reason for the setting them or any of them at Liberty."' 9
Other examples abound of the law's inconsistency in treating
blacks as persons with free will and as property.2' James Madison was
18. Quoted at p, 127 (emphasis added).
19. Id.
Generally, religion did rather badly concerning slavery, with the infrequent exceptions con-
fined to Pennsylvania until the eve of the Revolution. Roger Williams condoned slavery, and the
Reverends Jonathan Edwards, Ezra Stiles, and the Mathers all owned slaves. R. HOFSTADTER,
AMERICA AT 1750, at 102-03 (1970). Reverend George Whitefield, the instigator of the Great
Awakening and the most influential minister of his day, also supported the importation of slaves
to Georgia on the supposition that the Lord would not have made it so hot had He not intended
that black slaves work Georgia's fields. P. 245. The British Society for the Propagation of the
Gospel in Foreign Parts, which sought to convert the heathen, also owned slaves. The sermon by
Reverend Bacon in Maryland in 1743 was not atypical as he informed his slave congregation that
"your masters and mistresses are God's overseers." Quoted at p. 37. Things got offto a bad start
even in Massachusetts. John Winthrop's brother-in-law, Edward Downing, advised the leader of
the City upon a Hill that Massachusetts Bay could use a "juste warre" to obtain some Indians to
exchange for blacks, since "It]he colony will never thrive until we get ... a stock of slaves suffi-
cient to do our business." Quoted at p. 71.
. 20. Justice Thomas Ruffin of the North Carolina Supreme Court was the author of the most
infamous judicial opinion seeking to resolve this inconsistency, at a slightly later period. In State
v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 167, 169 (1829), which held that one who hired a slave from a master
was not liable for the intentional wounding of the slave, he wrote:
The end is the profit of the master, his security and the public safety; the subject, one
doomed in his own person, and his posterity, to live without knowledge and without the
capacity to make anything his own, and to toil that another may reap the fruits. What
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reduced to defending the constitutional provision counting a slave as
three-fifths of a person21 as reflective of "[t]he true state of the case."22
He argued that slaves "partake of both these qualities; being considered
by our laws, in some respects, as persons, and in other respects as prop-
erty." 3
The recognition that slaves were indeed more than chattel created
not only theological and political problems, but fear as well. Fear of
rebellion lead to increasingly harsh laws in order to control the slaves.
The pattern in South Carolina was a common one. Carolinians argued
that it was necessary to "use. . .the labor and service of negroes and
other slaves."'24 Slavery was assumed to be both scientifically and re-
ligiously compelled, since negroes "are of barbarous, wild, savage na-
tures, and such as renders them wholly unqualified to be governed by
the laws, customs, and practices of this Province." 25 Thus, harsh laws
were necessary to "restrain the disorders, rapines and inhumanity, to
which they are naturally prone and inclined. 2 6
Without becoming entangled in the debate over the frequency of
slave rebellions or whether there was a realistic basis for fears of slave
uprisings among whites, Judge Higginbotham does a good job of indi-
cating how such fears gradually increased and how allegations of slave
uprisings such as the New York Conspiracy of 1712 and the panic of
1741 produced harsher laws and more extreme racist views. The inse-
moral consideration shall be addressed to such a being to convince him what it is impos-
sible but that the most stupid must feel and know can never be true-that he is thus to
labor upon a principle of natural duty, or for the sake of his own personal happiness,
such services can only be expected from one who has no will of his own; who surrenders
his will in implicit obedience to that of another. Such obedience is the consequence only
of uncontrolled authority over the body. There is nothing else which can operate to
produce the effect. The power of the master must be absolute, to render the submission
of the slave perfect.
The North Carolina Supreme Court demonstrated nearly a century later that such outrages were
not a phenomenon restricted to the nineteenth century. In State v. Williams, 186 N.C. 627, 633
(1923), the court noted-
The best friends that the negro has are his white neighbors. The negro has been in many
respects a chosen people-brought here, the land of opportunity, among civilized people,
without any effort on their part, from Africa. The burden, "imposed, not sought," has
been on the white people of this State to civilize and Christianize them.
21. Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States
which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which
shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those
bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all
other Persons.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (adopted 1787; amended 1865 by the thirteenth amendment & 1868 by
the fourteenth amendment).
22. THE FEDERALIST No. 54 (J. Madison), at 354 (Modem Library ed. 1937).
23. Id.





curity of the white colonies goes beyond a Durkheimian compulsion to
assert community values by casting out those who can be defined as
different.27 Judge Higginbotham supplies a great deal of useful detail.
His chapters on the six colonies constitute a study in microcosm of the
brilliantly developed themes of Winthrop Jordan concerning the evolu-
tion of racism in white-black relations.
2 8
Control of slaves as well as economic needs in colonies such as
Georgia and South Carolina actually resulted in restrictions upon the
rights of slaveholders. These restrictions imposed a variety of duties
upon masters: restrictions upon manumission, widespread in other col-
onies as well; the requirement that slaveholders search slave quarters
every two weeks; and the penalties imposed if masters failed "to whip,
brand, cut the ear off, castrate, or make his slave lame" for running
away29 or failed to "permit or even oblige" slaves to attend religious
services. °
South Carolina may have been the most harsh, for reasons ranging
from her connections to Barbados slavery to the demands of cultivating
her rice crop. From its Fundamental Constitution of 1669, probably
drafted by John Locke and the first Earl of Shaftesbury, South Caro-
lina made the relationship of master and slave clear: "Every Freeman
of Carolina shall have absolute power and authority over Negro slaves,
of what opinion or Religion soever."' 1 But South Carolina was by no
means alone in legislating community rules of slavery that disregarded
the wishes and freedoms of the individual slaveholder. Most colonies
found it necessary to provide community compensation to masters
whose slaves were disabled or killed when punishment was meted out
against them, as an incentive to punish. Additionally, legislation was
repeatedly enacted in most colonies to compel owners to maintain ab-
solute power for its symbolic effect.
Indeed, one is constantly reminded of how precarious the early
settlers thought their New World experiment to be. The most interest-
ing example is in Judge Higginbotham's chapter on Georgia, which is
'probably the best in the book. Georgia was subject to a constant mili-
tary threat from Spaniards to the south and Indians all around. This
insecurity produced the crowning paradox in the duality of slaves as
27. See generally E. DURKHEIM, THE DIvIsION OF LABOR IN SocIEy (G. Simpson trans.
1960). For an excellent and provocative application of Durkheimian deviance theory to the his-
torical period Judge Higginbotham treats, see K. ERIKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS (1966).
28. See W. JORDAN, supra note 9.
29. P. 177.
30. Quoted at p. 249.
31. Quoted at p. 163.
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chattel property and persons with free will when Georgia offered slaves
rewards for military service. Soon after the inhabitants of Georgia
overcame General Oglethorpe's original ban on slavery in the colony,
they enacted an Act for Regulating the Militia in 1755. The govern-
ment was obligated to pay masters one shilling for each day of service
by an inducted slave, and compensation for any injury to his property.
No parallel compensation existed for white servants. At the same
time, any slaves who should "manfully Behave themselves in fight with
the enemy" would receive annually from the public treasury "a Livery
Coat, and pair of Breeches, made of good red Negro Cloth turn'd up
with Blue, and a Black Hat and pair of Black Shoes."32 Further, these
slaves would be "free'd and exempted from all personal Labour &
Service to their owner or Manager" on the anniversary day of their
manful service.3 For truly heroic service, such as killing one of the
enemy, taking a prisoner, or capturing the enemy colors, a slave might
be freed-and the master reimbursed out of the public treasury. Geor-
gia's willingness to reward courageous military action by those
"deemed in Law to be Chattels personal in the Hands of their Own-
ers' '34 contrasts with the lesser rewards reluctantly offered slaves who
aided the Revolutionary War effort. The willingness to utilize slaves
as soldiers to aid the Revolution came only out of desperation and the
fear that the promise by Lord Dunmore to reward freedom to Ameri-
can slaves who aided the British would be effective.
3 5
The Georgia experiment is also of primary interest for the insight
it provides into early conflict between American colonists and the
Mother Country. Ironically, the earliest claim by the Georgia settlers
that they were deprived of their birthright as Englishmen was occa-
sioned by the short-lived ban on slavery in Georgia from its founding
in 1735 until 1750. The Trustees, concerned with military security,
assistance to mercantilism, and reform of British poorhouse denizens,
initially banned the use of black slaves in addition to prohibiting their
importation. Judge Higginbotham argues convincingly that morality
played a negligible part in the ban. It was based largely on the fear of
slave rebellion and on the hope of attracting and reforming poor
whites. The most dramatic-but by no means the only evidence of
amoral motivation he cites-is that James Oglethorpe, the major
Trustee, owned many slaves on his South Carolina plantation and was
32. Quoted at p. 260.
33. Quoted at p. 261.
34. Quoted at p. 252.
35. See W. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONsTITUTIONALIM 54-55 (1977). In
fact, James Madison had to retrieve one of his own slaves who had fled behind the British lines.
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a Deputy Governor of the Royal African Company, a major force in
the international slave trade.
Just as the nation's ban on the international slave trade in 1808
was to be honored largely in the breach,16 the Georgia prohibition was
constantly flouted. Yet it bothered Georgians. The Trustees, with the
exception of Oglethorpe, were absentee governors. The local settlers
objected vigorously to rules handed down from afar and promulgated
by Trustees who were not allowed to reap financial gain or to hold land
individually in Georgia. The Trustees could be said to have occupied
John Rawls' Original Position.37 What happened to their grand
schemes for reform when confronted by the men and women on the
scene--on this side of the veil of ignorance-is sobering.
The settlers objected to the explicit paternalism of the Trustees.
They were more upset, however, by their inability to compete success-
fully with their neighbors in Carolina, because "Carolina can raise
everything that this Colony can; and they having their Labour so much
cheaper, will always ruin our Market, unless we are in some measure
on a Footing with them."3 As was so frequently the case in American
remonstrances against the Mother Country, this economic argument
translated readily into an argument couched in terms of the rights of
Englishmen.39 "[Not] even the flourishing of wine and silk can make a
colony of British subjects happy, if they are deprived of the liberties
and properties of their birthright, ' stated a 1741 narrative. 40  That
birthright included a right to own slaves. The comforting union of
economic interest and the rights of Englishmen helped to produce a
quick resolution in favor of the settlers who demanded slavery. By
1755 Georgia had a slave code as harsh in most respects as that in any
other colony. By the Revolution, Georgia had a higher percentage of
slaves in her population than any colony but South Carolina, which
had such a majority of slaves that a Swiss immigrant wrote, "Carolina
looks more like a negro country than like a country settled by white
people."5
4 1
36. W. DuBois, THE SUPPRESSION OF THE AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE TO THE -UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA 1638-1870, at 157-58, 178-87 (1896).
37. 1. RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). Beyond this ban on slavery, the Trustees fur-
ther demonstrated how out of touch they were with the realities of early Georgia by prohibiting
hard liquor.
38. Quoted at p. 242.
39. See generall, B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
230-319 (1967).
40. Quoted at p. 244.
41. Quoted at p. 192.
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Perhaps because this portrait of our nation's founding and the
treatment of blacks is so bleak, Judge Higginbotham goes a bit over-
board in his search for redeeming themes. For instance, the Dutch in
early New Amsterdam may have treated slaves more fairly than the
English, but Judge Higginbotham concedes that they tortured slaves,
presumed that a black was a slave and thereby placed the burden of
proving freedom upon the black, and employed a de facto slavery sys-
tem even if the law provided a status of half-freedom. Additionally,
the absence of early records makes it difficult to draw comparisons. A
weakness in Higginbotham's work is the failure to confront this meth-
odological problem. Nevertheless, that slavery grew increasingly
harsh after 1700 emerges as a clear pattern across geographic bounda-
ries.42 To a great extent this reflected increased racist assumptions and
increased anxiety over external and internal security, but it also may
have reflected the rationalization of existing patterns as articulated
through law. In the Matter of Color would be a stronger book if Judge
Higginbotham dealt more fully with the implications of this further
possibility.
In searching for some light in an otherwise entirely dismal history
of legalized barbarism, Judge Higginbotham is too quick in the closing
pages to turn to the English experience and call Lord Mansfield "a
giant in the cause of human freedom." 43 He emphasizes Lord Mans-
field's decision in Somerset,' which held that the air of England and
natural law were too pure to permit slavery on English soil-unless, of
course, slavery was supported by positive law. Close scrutiny of Lord
Mansfield's role as reluctant dragon and his subsequent attempt to
limit severely his holding might have led Judge Higginbotham to per-
ceive motives perhaps equally as "amoral" as the antislavery of Ogle-
42. Patterns concerning the status of free blacks and Indians do not emerge clearly, despite
the fact that individual cases are often sensitively treated by Judge Higginbotham.
43. P. 368.
44. Judge Higginbotham goes too far in favorably contrasting the English decision to deci-
sions in the United States. His claim that "[i]ndeed, until the violent upheaval of the Civil War a
century later.., no federal court in America had ruled that slavery was inconsistent with the
national legal tradition," p. 313, should be qualified in several respects. First, since there were no
federal courts until 1789, it is not fair to draw the comparison between federal decisions and an
English decision of 1772. Second, the issue rarely arose in federal courts, and at least some state
court judges overcame "The Judicial Can't," as Professor Cover puts it, to invalidate slavery. See
generally R. COVER, supra note 11, for a remarkably sensitive discussion of the dilemma faced by
judges in slavery cases and their varying responses. Third, it is not surprising that federal judges
did not find slavery in conflict with the national legal tradition, since it was not. Wendell Phillips
certainly had the best of the argument when he termed the United States Constitution a "pro-
slavery document." See generally W. WIECEK, supra note 35, at 62-83. Finally, Justice Story did
come close to doing what Judge Higginbotham states no federal court did in United States v. The
La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 845 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551) (condemning the slave
trade as violative of natural law).
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thorpe and the Georgia Trustees. While his analysis of Somerset
inadequately sets the social context and overemphasizes the impact of
lawyers' arguments, Judge Higginbotham is altogether persuasive
about the symbolic importance of the decision that "burst the confines
of its author's judgment"45 so that "it was no longer possible to take for
granted the universal legality of slave property."' 6  Whether Lord
Mansfield actually "had the vision to rise above the rationalizations of
his time. . . and forge a more humane path for English society"4 7 re-
mains problematic. But his decision took on a life of its own as an
antislavery symbol.
Judge Higginbotham's concluding chapter on the Declaration of
Independence-another vital antislavery symbol-is similarly disap-
pointing, though gracefully written and quite dramatic. In it he re-
counts the fundamental hypocrisy of the Revolution, and of the grand
words of the Declaration.48 But the impact of Somerset, the early anti-
slavery rhetoric, and the Declaration of Independence cannot be
treated adequately in the very few pages allowed the subject. For ex-
ample, the discussion of the deletion of the condemnation of the slave
trade, which Thomas Jefferson had included in his July 2 draft of the
Declaration,49 might have been usefully expanded. Nevertheless,
Judge Higginbotham is surely correct, and he says something im-
mensely important, when he stresses the moral authority of the Decla-
ration's assertion that "all men are created equal." From early and
odd assortments of Quakers and abolitionists to Reverend Martin Lu-
45. W. WIECEK, supra note 35, at 33. The impact of "neo-Somerset principles" upon the
antislavery movement in America is a major theme of Wiecek's book.
46. D. DAVIS, IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION, supra note 10, at 470.
47. P. 315.
48. Of course, some men such as James Otis and Anthony Benezet did connect protests
against the political "slavery" imposed by King George III and the actual slavery of some half-
million blacks.
49. For a provocative and detailed new account of the writing and meaning of the Declara-
tion of Independence, see G. WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA (1978). Jefferson's basic charge was
that the King had encouraged the slave trade (which was certainly true of British policy) and that
the American colonists had been coerced into acquiescence by vetoes of their attempts to impose
duties to stop the slave traffic (which was partially true and vastly overstated). The King may
have "prostituted his negative for suppressing every legislative attempt to prohibit or to restrain
this execrable commerce," but the Americans were anything but unwilling parties to the acts of
prostitution. Id at 67.
Jefferson's additional charge that the King was "now exciting those very people to rise in
arms among us, and to purchase that liberty of which he has deprived them" was an even weaker
moral claim. It was directed at Lord Dunmore's 1775 offer to free slaves who would fight against
their owners. Even an admirer of Jefferson such as Gary Wills must admit that Jefferson's first
charge concerning the slave trade was "in such a compromised light that the wonder is not how
Congress could reject it, but how Jefferson ever thought he could get it past that body of sharp-
eyed lawyers." Id. at 68. Wills also concedes that fomenting slave uprisings was a "morally
convoluted charge." Id. at 72.
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ther King, Jr., and Chief Justice Earl Warren, we are reminded of the
promise and the challenge of the Declaration. In words more impor-
tant than any others in American history, the Declaration "put moral
demands on all Americans who would ever quote it."50 The quota-
tions roll forth, however, as the promise remains unmet.
The greatest contribution of In the Matter of Color is its incontro-
vertible demonstration that the founders of our nation-in the North as
well as in the South-were remarkably able to rationalize their own
hypocrisy and to make the law both an instrument and a symbol of the
inhumane power they sought to secure. Yet because the law performs
such a potent symbolic function, exceptional interludes such as the de-
cision in Somerset and the Declaration of Independence actually may
make a difference. Their promise may carry beyond the original in-
tent of their authors. The connections will be unfathomable, but all of
us directly involved with the law must hope that in some
way-unquantifiable and uncertain as it must be-we may help to
purge our society of the sins committed in the name of the law.
Judge Higginbotham's scholarship issues a great challenge. The
bleak details of the law of race relations constitute an overwhelming
case for his assertion that "racial deprivation . . . gained the official
approval of the American legal establishment."''5 As W. E. B. DuBois
stated in the first monograph in the Harvard Historical Studies, "No
American can study the connection of slavery with United States his-
tory, and not devoutly pray that his country may never have a similar
social problem to solve until it shows more capacity for such work than
it has shown in the past." 2 He went on to note, "It behooves nations
as well as men to do things at the very moment when they ought to be
done."
5 3
That we barely have begun to attempt to deliver on the promise of
the Declaration of Independence is all too clear. In the Matter of
Color teaches a discomforting lesson about basic injustice under law,
and it teaches it with clarity and with force.
50. P. 384.
51. P. 11.
52. W. DUBoIS, supra note 36, at 197.
53. Id. at 199.
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